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WISCONSIN'S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION LAWS: HAS THE WISCONSIN
LEGISLATURE LEFT THE CRIMINALS AND THE
CONSTITUTION BEHIND?
I. INTRODUCTION
Shunning, shaming, and societal ostracism stemming from the collective
perception of one's character have persisted since the beginning of societal
evolution. One need only mention characters such as Miss Havisham of
Great Expectations and Boo Radley of To Kill a Mockingbird to illustrate that
societal ostracism based on the communal assessment of one's character-
whether warranted or unwarranted-has even been memorialized in literature
that has stood the test of time. Under some circumstances, public shaming
upon one's commitment of a vulgar act can be justified to an extreme extent;
other times, it is completely unjustified and fueled by an utterly false
perception of reality. Convicted sex offenders released from incarceration to
live among the public fall somewhere in the gray area between these two
extremes. On one hand, these offenders committed heinous crimes that
harshly impact society, and some of these offenders may have a higher risk
than other criminals of recommitting a similar type of crime upon their release
from incarceration; on the other hand, these offenders paid their debt to
society through incarceration and should not be punished in the present for a
crime they may not commit in the future.
Indeed, with the recent sensationalization of sex abuse crimes committed
by priests and others in positions of power over children, discussions
regarding sex crimes and the necessary response to these crimes have become
commonplace at water coolers and dinner tables around the country. State
legislatures certainly are cognizant of these very real concerns, as legislatures
in all fifty states have enacted various forms of mandatory sex offender
registration and notification requirements in an attempt to keep communities
informed as to just who may have moved next door.' Under Wisconsin's sex
offender registration and notification laws, convicted sex offenders are
1. Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventative State: Procedural Due Process and
Sex Offender Communit
, 
Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172 (1999); see
also State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 19, 605 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Wis. 2000) (citing Roe v. Farwell, 999
F. Supp. 174, 177 n.I (D. Mass. 1998)).
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
required to supply personal information to a registry.2 This information is
subsequently disseminated to certain named agencies 3 and to the public upon
the fulfillment of various prerequisites 4 and the information is posted on an
Internet site.5
Predictably, the current sex offender registration and notification laws
have faced several challenges under various constitutional provisions,
including the Equal Protection Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Due
Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Bill of
Attainder Clause, and the constitutional rights to privacy and to travel
interstate. 6 In 2003, the United States Supreme Court tackled the issue of
whether Connecticut's sex offender registration and notification scheme
violated a convicted sex offender's constitutional right to procedural due
process. 7 Although succinctly holding that no such violation occurred, the
Supreme Court explicitly left open the possibility that these laws violated
constitutional principles of substantive due process. 8  Accordingly, the
constitutional challenge addressed in this Comment is whether Wisconsin's
sex offender registration and notification laws comport with substantive due
process requirements pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
whether they would withstand any constitutional challenge pursuant to United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The following discussion will address the constitutionality of Wisconsin's
sex offender registration and notification procedures pursuant to substantive
due process jurisprudence. Part II of this Comment expounds on the events
immediately preceding the enactment of Megan's Law; it also explores
Wisconsin's enactment of the same. Part III discusses case law providing the
basis for the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe9 and summarizes the decision itself. Part IV addresses
2. WIS. STAT. § 301.45(lg) (2002).
3. § 301.46(4). These agencies and organizations include: public and private schools, day care
providers, child welfare agencies, group homes, shelter care facilities, foster homes, county
departments, the Department of Justice, the Department of Public Instruction, the Department of
Health and Family Services, neighborhood watch programs, the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts
organizations, and any other community-based public or nonprofit organization that the department
determines should have access to the information. Id.
4. § 301.46(5).
5. § 301.46(5n). Wisconsin's Sex Offender Registry is located online at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/.
6. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 469 (6th Cir. 1999).
7. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
8. Id. at 8.
9. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
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the various liberty interests applicable to sex offender notification laws that
are grounded in the doctrine of substantive due process: privacy, employment,
and personal security. Part V analyzes the constitutionality of Wisconsin's
sex offender notification laws, concluding that the laws' infringement on sex
offenders' liberty interests deprives offenders of substantive due process and
renders the laws unconstitutional.
II. MEGAN'S LAW: THE PRODUCT OF PUBLIC ALARM
An examination of the tragic origin of Megan's law is essential to
understanding the elements of Wisconsin's sex offender registration and
notification laws.
A. Megan's Law
Public infuriation following the sexual abuse and murder of Megan
Kanka, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl,' 0 fueled the New Jersey
Legislature's enactment of the 1994 "Megan's Law."" Following New
Jersey's lead, all fifty states quickly imposed 2 similar forms of registration
requirements on sex offenders.' 3 Many states also enacted statutes that
mandated community notification of the sex offender's personal registration
information.'
4
With its 1996 amended version of the Jacob Wetterling Act,' 5 the federal
10. Michelle L. Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The
Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of
the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 788, 789 (1996). After Megan's neighbor lured the young girl into his
home with the promise of seeing his new puppy, he asphyxiated and raped young Megan while she
was unconscious. Id. Megan's killer had been convicted of two prior sex offenses; Megan's family
was never informed that the convicted sex offender had moved into their neighborhood. Id.
11. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 et seq. (West 2003). "Megan's Law" is the commonly used
name for New Jersey's Sex Offender Registration Act.
12. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 814. Some critics believe the laws were passed too hastily
and that lawmakers failed to consider the constitutional or policy implications of the laws. Id.; see
also Koresh A. Avrahamian, A Critical Perspective: Do "Megan 's Laws" Really Shield Children
From Sex-Predators?, 19 J. Juv. L. 301, 316 (1998) ("The hasty fashion in which Megan's Law was
crafted is the source of its greatest weakness, i.e., its inability to provide a comprehensive and
fundamental solution to the problem of violent sex crimes against children.").
13. See, e.g., State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 19, 605 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Wis. 2000); Logan, supra
note 1, at 1172.
14. Andrea L. Fischer, Note, Florida's Community Notification of Sex Offenders on the
Internet: the Disregard of Constitutional Protections for Sex Offenders, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 505,
507 (1997).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2003). The original version of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act was enacted in 1994. Fullmer v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 207 F. Supp. 2d 650, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2002). This 1994 law "required the
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government reinforced its support for stringent sex offender regulation when
it extended sex offender registration a step further to include public
notification of the sex offender's personal information.' 6 Upon signing the
amendment into law, President Clinton zealously declared: ."If you dare to
prey on our children, the law will follow you wherever you go-state to state,
town to town."" 7 The Wetterling Act commissioned "guidelines for a child
sex offender registration law while allowing states to enact more stringent
requirements if they so chose,',' 8 and the Act instructed the release of
"'relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning aspecific person required to register. ' '19 The Act also mandated that state law
enforcement, under the threat of fund withholdment, 20 "'shall release [the
registrants'] relevant information that is necessary to protect the public."' 2'
Thus, the federal government directed the existence of a public notification
requirement; however, the federal government left much latitude to the states
in determining whether an offender's personal information should be
disseminated.22 As a result, the states opting to do so have enacted a gardenvarity • 23
variety of notification requirements.
registration of persons convicted of offenses listed in the statute, defined as offenses which
include... 'sexually violent offenses."' Id. at 652 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1)). Congress
amended the Jacob Wetterling Act in 1996 "to provide that registry information may be disclosed for
any permissible state law purpose, and that information shall be released when necessary to protect
the public." Id. at 653.
16. Logan, supra note 1, at 1173.
17. Amy L. Van Duyn, The Scarlet Letter Branding: A Constitutional Analysis of Community
Notification Provisions in Sex Offender Statutes, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 635, 644 (1999) (quoting Linda
Kleindienst, Clinton Signs Tougher Megan's Law, SUN-SENTINEL, May 18, 1996, at 3A).
18. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 790.
19. Van Duyn, supra note 17, at 645 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)(2) (Supp. 1996)).
"Officials have utilized a variety of means to notify residents of the presence of sex criminals,
including front-page newspaper articles, community meetings, bright-colored fliers, and wanted
posters." Id.
20. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 796. "[T]he Jacob Wetterling Act required states to enact a
registration system for child sex offenders by 1997 or lose ten percent of the state's share of federal
grants for local and state crime-fighting programs." Id. If a state failed to comply with the Act, it
would lose its portion of more than $100 million in federal grants. Id.
21. Logan, supra note 1, at 1173 (quoting Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2(d) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (1995 & Supp. 1999))).
22. Id. at 1174. The federal government left the following questions to the state's discretionary
decision-making powers: "(1) which offenders should be the target of disclosure; (2) the information
gathered and the extent of disclosure; and (3) the standards and procedures, if any, appropriate to
these determinations." Id.
23. Id. at 1175. The states' sex offender laws include everything from "particularized risk
assessments" to "compulsory approach[es]" pursuant to which the offender is not afforded a right to
a hearing. ld In some states, including Wisconsin, local law enforcement determines the recidivism
risk level. Id. at 1176.
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B. The Wisconsin Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
1. The Registration Requirements
Following New Jersey's lead, Wisconsin drastically revised its existing
sex offender registration statute and enacted its own version of Megan's Law
in 1995.24 Under section 301.45(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes, the
Department of Corrections (DOC) must maintain a registry of each sex
offender's registration information.2 5 Offenders are subject to mandatory
registration requirements if convicted of certain named offenses, 2 6 and
Wisconsin courts retain the discretion to mandate offender registration for
other listed offenses.2 7 Offenders that fulfill enumerated criteria are subject to
lifetime registration,28 and all other offenders are required to register for
24. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 18, 21, 605 N.W.2d 199, 203-05 (Wis. 2000).
25. See generally WIS. STAT. § 301.45(2)(a) (2002). At the time of the offender's initial
registration, the DOC must disclose the offender's information to "the chief of police of the
community and the sheriff of the county in which the person is residing, working, or attending
school." State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 94, 33, 630 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Wis. 2001).
26. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SUPERVISION OF SEX OFFENDERS: A
HANDBOOK FOR AGENTS, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification, 7.3-7.4 (2002)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Offenders convicted of the following offenses are subject to mandatory
registration: First, Second, and Third Degree Sexual Assault, Sexual Exploitation by Therapist, False
Imprisonment and Kidnapping (but only if the victim was under the age of eighteen and the offender
was not the victim's parent), Incest, Rape, Sexual Intercourse with a Child, Indecent Behavior with a
Child, Enticing Child for Immoral Purposes, First or Second Degree Sexual Assault of a Child,
Repeated Acts of Sexual Assault, Sexual Exploitation of Child, Forced Viewing of Sexual Activity,
Incest with a Child, Child Enticement, Soliciting a Child for Prostitution, Sexual Assault of a Student
by School Instructional Staff Person, Exposing a Child to Harmful Materials (felony only),
Possession of Child Pornography, Child Sex Offender Working/Volunteering with Children,
Abduction of Another's Child, Sex Crimes Law Commitment, and Sexually Violent Person
Commitment. Id. Additionally, an individual who pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or
defect to one of the listed offenses is subject to mandatory registration. Id.
27. Id at 7.5. Wisconsin courts have discretion to require persons convicted of certain crimes
to register if "the underlying conduct is sexually motivated, [the r]egistration of the offender is in the
best interest of public safety[, or rlegistration was not required at time of conviction; but for reasons
listed above, offender is later identified as person who should register." Id Discretionary
registration is applicable for the following offenses:
Chapter 940 Crimes Against Life and Bodily Security
Chapter 944 Crimes Against Sexual Morality
Chapter 948 Crimes Against Children
ss.971.17 Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Disease
ss.943.01 to 943.15 Certain Crimes Against Property
Id.
28. Id. at 7.6. Offenders that fulfill any of the following criteria are subject to lifetime
registration: offenders with two or more separate convictions of any of the offenses listed in note 26;
2004]
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fifteen years following the discharge of supervision or the expiration of a
sentence. 29  A convicted offender that is required to register must supply
personal information regarding his 30 physical characteristics, address, and
employer. 3' Notably, the offender is subject to ongoing registration
requirements, with a penalty of up to $10,000 or nine months imprisonment
upon the first offense for knowingly 33 failing to comply with these continuing
requirements. 34  Only in extremely limited circumstances 35 is an offender
permitted to move the court for a hearing if the offender believes that he is
exempt from compliance with the registration requirements.
36
2. The Notification Requirements
As will be discussed in this section, all convicted sex offenders are subject
any offender that was found not guilty by reason of mental disease for a violation, solicitation,
conspiracy, or attempt to commit first or second degree sexual assault, first or second degree sexual
assault of a child, or repeated acts of sexual assault; any offender that was committed as a Sexually
Violent Person; any offender that was court ordered to comply with registration requirements for life;
and any offender subject to lifetime supervision. Id.
29. Id.
30. Although not all sex offenders are male, sex offenders will be generically referred to in the
masculine form throughout this Comment.
31. WIS. STAT. § 301.45(2) (2002). The offender must provide his "date of birth, gender, race,
height, weight and hair and eye color." Id. Furthermore, he must provide the following: "[t]he
statute the person violated that subjects the person to the requirements of this section, the date of
conviction, adjudication or commitment, and the county or, if the state is not this state, the state in
which the person was convicted, adjudicated or committed." Id. The offender may also have to
provide other applicable information, including the address of his or her employer, his home address,
and any school that the offender will be or is attending. Id.
32. § 301.45(3). An offender subject to lifetime registration must notify the Department of
Corrections every ninety days to verify or update his current personal information. Id. All other
offenders must verify or update their information once every calendar year. Id. Further, the
offenders are required to update their information whenever their personal information changes. §
301.45(4).
33. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 831. To prove that the offender "knowingly" failed to
comply with the registration requirements, the offender must have received notice of the requirement.
Id. In fact, "[w]ithout such notice, the state will be unable to show probable knowledge of the
obligation, and the offender will be immune from punishment for failing to register." Id.
34. § 301.45(6).
35. § 301.45(lm)(a). An offender is not required to comply with the reporting requirements if
all of the following apply: (1) the offender satisfies the offense criteria based on his violation, or his
conspiracy, solicitation, or attempt to commit any of the designated offenses; (2) the offender's
sexual offense did not involve sexual intercourse either by the use of force or with a victim under the
age of twelve years; and (3) at the time of the violation, the offender had not attained the age of
nineteen years and was not more than four years older or four years younger than the child. Id. If the
offender believes that he fulfills these elements, the offender may move the court for a hearing to
decide whether he must comply with the registration requirements. Id.
36. See id.
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to a certain level of community notification of their registration information.37
However, the DOC employs a special notification procedure for those
convicted sex offenders that are determined to necessitate a Special Bulletin
Notification. 38 A Special Bulletin Notification (SBN) is "an active, written
notification process whereby law enforcement officials, in the county and
areas of the offender's residence, employment or school enrollment, will
receive detailed information from the DOC ... on a specific offender prior to
their scheduled release from confinement." 39 An SBN must be issued to law
enforcement if the offender was committed under the Sexually Violent
Persons provision or if he was twice convicted of a sex offense; the DOC is
also vested with the discretion to determine if an SBN is warranted for cases
not requiring mandatory bulletins.40 Additionally, an SBN must be issued for
all offenders who are referred for a Special Purpose Evaluation to determine if
commitment is warranted, and regardless of the results of the evaluation, an
SBN will be issued prior to the release of these offenders.4 '
Upon receipt of the SBN, each convicted sex offender is assigned to one
of three notification levels.42 Local law enforcement, sex offender specialists,
probation and parole agents, and victim/witness coordinators evaluate the
level of notification and assign each convicted offender to a category.43 The
ultimate notification level decision is to be determined by law enforcement.
44
If a convicted sex offender is designated as a Level One offender, his personal
information is disseminated only to law enforcement and not to the general
public.45  If an offender is designated as a Level Two offender, his
information is disseminated to specific individuals and groups; these
individuals and groups are determined depending on the particular facts of the
37. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS,
Digital Photography of Offenders 1 (2001) [hereinafter Digital Photography].
38. See Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/proginfo/communitynotification.jsp.
39. Id.
40. HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7.11-7.12.
41. Id.
42. See Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/fyi/faq.jsp.
43. See id.; see also James A. Billings & Crystal L. Bulges, Maine's Sex Offender Registration
andNotification Act: Wise or Wicked?, 52 ME. L. REV. 175, 248 (2000) ("DOC personnel simply do
not have the training or education to attempt behavior prediction, an ability that has thus far eluded
even the most experienced of psychologists.").
44. HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7.13.
45. See Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/fyi/faq.jsp.
2004]
MARQUETTE LA W REVIEW
situation. 46  A Level Three offender is subject to community-wide
notification, including neighborhood meetings, door-to-door notification, and
media publications.47 In its original notification procedure proposal, the DOC
discouraged the use of "'mass media releases, distribution of door-to-door
fliers, or any other method of notification that may be described as
'intrusive'",;48 currently, however, probation agents often employ these
methods when complying with the notification requirements. 49  Modem
standards dictate that the offender's information may be shared with
"significant others, landlords, neighbors, employers, etc., if it is determined
that providing the information is in the best interest of public safety and/or the
offender's rehabilitation." 50  After the offender's notification level is
determined, the offender's registration information is disseminated to the
public accordingly.
All registered offenders are subject to partial public notification of their
registration information--even if they do not necessitate a Special Bulletin
Notification. Even though the majority of convicted sex offenders do not
necessitate Special Bulletin Notifications, all convicted sex offenders that
register must be photographed, and as discussed below, 51 are subject to the
public dissemination of some of their registration information on the
52 53Internet.52 Additionally, upon request, the victim of the offender's crime, as
well as numerous agencies and organizations,54 are entitled to receive any of
the information included in the sex offender registry regarding any registered
offender. 55 This dissemination may include the offender's home address and
employment information.56 Notably, the general public may receive any of
the sex offender's registration information upon request, including his exact
address and place of employment, if the police chief or sheriff determines that
providing this information is necessary to protect the public.57 Further, the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 25, 605 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Wis. 2000) (citing WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SEX OFFENDER COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION ii (1994)).
49. Telephone Interview with Ronald P. Blair, Probation & Parole Agent, Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (Sept. 28, 2003).
50. HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7.14.
51. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
52. Digital Photography, supra note 37, at 1.
53. WIS. STAT. § 301.46(3) (2002).
54. § 301.46(4). For a list of these agencies and organizations, see supra note 3.
55. See generally § 301.46.
56. §§ 301.46(3)(e), (4)(a).
57. § 301.46(5).
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Wisconsin DOC is required to provide access to the registrant's information
through an Internet site and by any other means that the department
determines are appropriate. 8 The offender's photograph and offense history
are included on this website, but the offender's exact address is purposefully
excluded because of fears of vigilantism against the offenders.59 Wisconsin's
laws attempt to combat acts of vigilantism by prescribing that if any
individual utilizes the information gained through the sex offender registry to
commit a crime, that individual is subject to misdemeanor or felony
penalties.6°
1II. OUT WITH THE OLD AND IN WITH THE NEW: RETIRING PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO SEX OFFENDER NOTIFICATION LAWS
State sex offender registration and notification laws have faced numerous
constitutional challenges. In 2003, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether Connecticut's sex offender registration and
notification laws violated procedural due process requirements pursuant to the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 61 As
discussed below, courts and commentators addressing this issue, prior to the
decision, expected the Court to apply the test it set forth in Paul v. Davis; the
lower courts almost uniformly applied this test in their analyses of the issue.
The Court did not apply this test and quickly rejected the procedural due
process claim. 62 However, the Court left open the possibility that these laws
violated principles of substantive due process. 63
To fully understand the evolution of due process constitutional challenges
to sex offender notification laws and the subsequent analysis of the
constitutionality of these laws pursuant to principles of substantive due
process, this section will discuss case law providing the baseline for the
Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v.
Doe64 and summarize the decision itself.
58. § 301.46(5n).
59. See Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/fyi/faq.jsp.
60. HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7.15.
61. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
62. Id. at 7.
63. id. at 8.
64. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
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A. The Evolution of the "Stigma Plus" Test
Wisconsin v. Constantineau65 is an influential decision in which the Court
initially acknowledged a reputational liberty interest grounded in due process.
In this case, the United States Supreme Court held a Wisconsin statute
unconstitutional under the guise of procedural due process. 66 The Wisconsin
statute permitted local law enforcement to post warnings in liquor stores;
these warnings instructed store clerks not to sell liquor to listed individuals
who were labeled excessive drinkers. 67 The listed individuals failed to receive
a hearing before the dissemination of this information.
68
The Constantineau Court opined that "where the State attaches 'a badge
of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play .... Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential., 69  The Court held that because these warnings harmed the
reputations of the individuals who were subjects of the improper posting,
these individuals were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard
preceding the dissemination of the information. 70 Consequently, at this time,
"the concept of 'liberty' in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears to have been widely understood to encompass a person's
interest in his or her good name and reputation, without more., 71
In Paul v. Davis,72 the Court promptly about-faced and held that an injury
to the plaintiffs reputation alone was not sufficient to warrant procedural due
process protection. 73 In Paul, the plaintiffs photograph was included on a
flier that was circulated to store owners.74 The flier was circulated to warn the
owners about recently arrested shoplifters. 75 The plaintiff had been arrested
for shoplifting but was never convicted.76 The plaintiff sued, alleging that the
failure to afford him notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
65. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
66. Id. at 437.
67. Id. at 434.
68. Id. at 437.
69. Id. (internal citations omitted).
70. Id.
71. See Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 51 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9 (2d ed. 1988)).
72. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
73. Id. at 702.
74. Id. at 695.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 695-96.
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dissemination of his photograph violated his right to procedural due process. 77
The Paul Court, speculatively driven by concerns of federalism,78 held that
the only injury the plaintiff suffered was an injury to his reputation; the Court
rejected the claim that an individual's interest in his or her reputation alone
was tantamount to a deprivation of procedural due process, thereby creating
the "stigma plus" test.
79
The Paul Court subsequently held that a plaintiff could satisfy the "plus"
factor by illustrating the abrogation or alteration of a more tangible interest,
such as "a right or status previously recognized by state law." 80 To state a
procedural due process claim under the Due Process Clause, the Paul Court
held that a plaintiff must assert two wrongs to satisfy the "stigma plus" test:
"(1) the utterance of a statement about him or her that is sufficiently
derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being
proved false, and that he or she claims is false,8 and (2) some tangible
and material state-imposed burden or alteration of his or her status or
of a right in addition to the stigmatizing statement."
82
77. Id. at 698.
78. See Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 53 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. granted,
122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002). As the Department of Public Safety court opined:
If, as some thought before Paul, the Fourteenth Amendment notion of "liberty"
encompassed an individual's unadorned interest in his or her reputation, then the issue
whether an allegation of "stigma" stated a federal constitutional or state-law claim would
depend entirely on whether the defendant happened to be a state officer or a private citizen.
A plaintiff who was defamed by a private defendant could sue only in state court on a state
law claim; a plaintiff who was defamed by a government actor could sue in federal court
on a federal claim. Such a regime would "trivialize the centuries-old principle of due
process" by enlarging the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the type of
"arbitrary exercise of the powers of government" against which that provision was
intended to guard .... The "plus" requirement avoids this result by ensuring that a plaintiff
cannot allege as a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest an injury that
could have been inflicted by a private citizen in a position analogous to the state actor.
Id. at 53-54 (internal citations omitted). Consequently, "[s]ome contend that the Court's ruling in
Paul was motivated by a desire to prevent torts committed by state actors from automatically
implicating a federal constitutional right, thereby meriting federal court jurisdiction." Earl-Hubbard,
supra note 10, at 839 (citing TRIBE, supra note 71, at 1397-98).
79. Paul, 424 U.S. at 702.
80. Id. at 711.
81. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d at 47 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02, 710-11).
The plaintiff must only "allege, not prove, that the statement is false in order to establish a due
process right to the hearing he seeks." Id. at 48 (quoting Brandt. v. Bd. of Co-Op Educ. Servs., 820
F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir. 1987)).
82. Id. at 47 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02, 710-11).
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The Paul decision "has been widely condemned as an unjustified
departure from what appeared to be the unequivocal recognition in
Constantineau of a 'reputational' liberty against government
stigmatization.
83
B. Challenges to Connecticut's "Megan's Law"
When addressing whether state sex offender registration and notification
laws are constitutional pursuant to principles of procedural due process, the
lower courts have applied the Paul v. Davis Court's "stigma plus" test in their
analyses.84 In the decision for which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the procedural due process issue, Doe v. Department of Public Safety
ex rel. Lee,85 the Second Circuit applied this "stigma plus" test as well.
In Department of Public Safety, the Second Circuit held that
Connecticut's version of Megan's Law, 86 which bears a remarkable
resemblance to Wisconsin's version of Megan's Law, 87 was unconstitutional
88
on the grounds of procedural due process. In reaching this holding, the
Department of Public Safety court applied the Paul Court's "stigma plus" test.
With respect to the stigma component, the plaintiff in Department of Public
Safety asserted that the stigmatization of his status as a dangerous sex offender
was false.89 Based on this false stigmatization, the plaintiff alleged he was
entitled to a hearing in which he could prove that he was not a threat to public
safety.90 The court agreed with the plaintiff and held that the registration and
notification requirements damaged the plaintiffs reputation and constituted a
83. Logan, supra note 1, at 1185 (citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1983-84 (1996)).
84. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d
1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Fullmer v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 207 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Mich. 2002);
Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2001); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass.
1997).
85. 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001).
86. Under Connecticut's version of "Megan's Law," the offender was required to register with
the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Id. at 43-44. Like the Wisconsin registrant, the Connecticut
registrant was required to provide the DPS with "identifying factors," and the offender was subject to
continuing legal obligations, such as annual registration requirements and information updates. Id.
Connecticut's "Megan's Law" also mandated that the DPS make the registry available to the public
and create an Internet site, and it required the DPS to issue a notice to the media once per year
regarding the means of accessing the registry. Id. at 44.
87. See generally WiS. STAT. §§ 301.45-301.46 (2002).
88. Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 59 (2d Cir. 2001).
89. Id. at 49.
90. Id.
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false stigmatization. 91
Turning to the second component of the "stigma plus" test, the
Department of Public Safety court articulated that to constitute a "plus" factor,
the sex offender laws must "(1) alter the plaintiffs legal status, and (2) [be]
'governmental in nature."' 92 Because they were enacted by the legislature, the
sex offender laws were governmental in nature. Moreover, because the
offender was burdened with a new set of legal duties, these legal duties
constituted an alteration of the offender's status under state law. 94 The court
held that the plaintiffs legal status was altered based on the continuing
registration duties 95 imposed on the offender.96 Because the plaintiff fulfilled
both components of the "stigma plus" test, the court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to a hearing in accordance with principles of procedural due process
to determine whether he was likely to be dangerous before being labeled as
such by a registry.
97
The Department of Public Safety court's holding was at variance with
holdings of other courts. The circuits had split jaggedly on the issue of what
liberty interests, if any, fulfilled the "plus" component of the test, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari presumably to resolve this split.
98
C. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
Much to the astonishment of courts and countless commentators who
premised predictions of the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision on the
Paul v. Davis Court's "stigma plus" test, the Supreme Court in Connecticut
Department of Public Safety v. Doe99 failed to apply this "stigma plus" test,
and it premised its decision on a seemingly simple principle. The Court found
91. Id. at 49.
92. Id. at 56 (quoting McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1986)).
93. Id. at 57.
94. Id. The Department of Public Safety court found that requiring an alteration of the
plaintiff's legal rights also served the federalism-based function of the "plus" factor: "to ensure that
the plaintiff cannot convert a state-law defamation claim into a § 1983 action because of the mere
fortuity that he or she is suing a state defendant." Id.
95. The continuing registration duties were as follows: Offenders convicted of a sexually
violent offense were required to verify their addresses every ninety days, and any other offender was
required to verify his address annually for ten years. Id. at 43. If a registrant changed his address or
regularly traveled out of state, he was required to notify the DPS, and the registrant was required to
submit to be photographed per the Commissioner's request, or at least once every five years. Id. The
failure to comply with these requirements was punishable by up to five years in prison. Id.
96. Id. at 59.
97. Id. at 62.
98. Id. at 43-44.
99. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
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it futile to address the petitioners' contention that they failed to deprive
respondent of a liberty interest pursuant to Paul v. Davis; instead, the Court
opined that "due process does not entitle [the respondent] to a hearing to
establish a fact that is not material under the Connecticut statute." 100  The
Court stated that in decisions such as Wisconsin v. Constantineau, the fact at
issue was "relevant to the inquiry at hand."' 01  In the case at bar, the sex
offender sought a hearing to prove that he was not currently dangerous.'
2
With respect to the relevance of this fact to the inquiry at hand, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, delivering the Court's opinion, stated as follows:
Here, however, the fact that respondent seeks to prove-that he is not
currently dangerous-is of no consequence under Connecticut's
Megan's Law. As the DPS Website explains, the law's requirements
turn on an offender's conviction alone-a fact that a convicted
offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to
contest.... No other fact is relevant to the disclosure of registrants'
information. Indeed, the disclaimer on the Website explicitly states
that respondent's alleged nondangerousness simply does not matter.
In short, even if respondent could prove that he is not likely to be
currently dangerous, Connecticut has decided that the registry
information of all sex offenders-currently dangerous or not-must
be publicly disclosed.'l 3
This succinct holding will serve to terminate procedural due process
claims to sex offender notification laws.104 It also will curtail the lower
courts' usage of the "stigma plus" test in addressing these decisions.
0 5
Pursuant to the Court's explicit language, however, out of the ashes of these
100. Id. at 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245, 1264
(2003) (opining that "Connecticut's statute does not violate procedural due process because the
registration requirement hinges upon the sex offender's conviction alone-a conviction the sex
offender previously had the opportunity to contest at trial").
104. As one commentator asserts, the Court's opinion "appears to put procedural due process
challenges to sex offender registration and community notification laws to death." Wilkins, supra
note 103, at 1263.
105. Id. at 1266 (reasoning that because the Court explicitly opted not to analyze the case under
the "stigma plus" test, "[1lower courts must abandon the use of Paul v. Davis to analyze any future
procedural due process challenges to sex offender registration and community notification laws ....
Any relief sought in the due process context must be asserted under substantive due process").
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procedural due process claims may arise a successful challenge that would
render sex offender notification provisions violative of the Constitution:
substantive due process. Indeed, explicitly reserving the possibility that a
substantive due process claim would be successful, the Court stated as
follows: "Unless respondent can show that the substantive rule of law is
defective (by conflicting with a provision of the Constitution), any hearing on
current dangerousness is a bootless exercise."' 0 6 This statement will provide
the baseline for the analysis contained subsequently in this Comment.
Although the decision was a nine to zero decision, a number of Justices
wrote separately to express their views. Justice Scalia, concurring in the
Court's decision, agreed with the Court's reservation of the possibility of a
successful substantive due process challenge to these laws. 0 7 Justices Souter
and Ginsburg concurred in a separate opinion and agreed that the notification
laws may be susceptible to a substantive due process challenge. 0 8 These
Justices also maintained that the selective dissemination of sex offender
registration information might present an actionable claim pursuant to
principles of equal protection.'
0 9
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND ITS INTERPLAY WITH SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
This Part will address the various liberty interests applicable to sex
offender notification laws that are grounded in the doctrine of substantive due
process: a convicted offender's right to privacy, his right to pursue
employment, and his right to personal security.
A. The Evolution of Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process is derived from the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution; these Amendments protect
individuals from governmental deprivations of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."" 0  As illustrated by the above discussion
addressing the Paul v. Davis Court's "stigma plus" test, the doctrine of due
process can be segregated into two components: procedural due process and
106. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7-8.
107. Id. at 8-9.
108. Id. at 9-10.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also G. Scott Rafshoon, Community Notification of Sex
Offenders: Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1647 (1995) ("The
Due Process Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect individuals against government
interference with life, liberty, and property.").
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substantive due process. Both of these components constitute restraints on
state and federal legislative power and serve to protect individual rights."'
Unquestionably, substantive due process is an evolving constitutional
doctrine encompassing many individual liberties-none of which will be
found anywhere near the text of the Constitution.' 12  In their rawest form,
"[t]he due process clauses recognize the essential obligation of government to
protect the individual's physical security, liberty, and right to acquire, enjoy,
and dispose of wealth (property), within the limits of the community's duty to
protect the collective welfare."'" 13  Evolving from these basic and essential
obligations have arisen the following judge-made liberty interests: the "right
to marry, to procreate, to rear and educate children, to use contraceptives, and
to terminate a pregnancy,"' 14
freedom from bodily restraint,... the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge,... to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
11. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 82 (2003) ("Attention
is rightly paid to substantive due process as a restraint on legislative power."); Kelly A. Spencer, Sex
Offenders and the City: Ban Orders, Freedom ofMovement, and Doe v. City of Lafayette, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 297, 302 (2002) ("The doctrine of substantive due process restricts state regulations
that abridge individual rights."). Moreover, as one commentator asserted:
The language of the Constitution suggests that the due process clauses are conditional,
rather than absolute, guarantees of life, liberty, and property. Neither the Fifth nor the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to frustrate the legitimate exercise of governmental
authority to promote the public's health, safety, morals, or welfare. They were designed to
prevent government from depriving people of fundamental rights without a justification
rooted in the public interest.
EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY ix (1996).
112. ORTH, supra note 1 11, at 82 (stating that the application of substantive due process has
yielded controversy and that "its historical development has carried due process the farthest from its
roots").
113. KEYNES, supra note 111, at 6.
114. Id at 5. With respect to these liberty interests, one commentator has opined:
Since 1965, U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning marriage, the family, contraception,
and abortion have kindled a national debate about the role of the judiciary in a democratic
society. The Court's critics have argued that it is beyond the competence of the federal
judiciary to make policy in these areas. The Court's advocates have responded that
questions of marital privacy and reproductive liberty implicate constitutional rights that
federal judges are eminently suited to decide.
Id. atx.
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pursuit of happiness by free men.' 15
The liberty interests grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
that are relevant to the analysis of the constitutionality of sex offender
registration and notification laws include the right to privacy, the right to
employment, the right to personal security, the right to travel, and the rights to
housing and family relations."
16
The doctrine of substantive due process "requires states to enact
legislation that is 'fair and reasonable in content' and 'further[s] a legitimate
governmental objective.""'17 If an individual can identify a fundamental right
and a court finds that the government infringed on this right (the right must be
deemed fundamental and no less), then a court will apply strict scrutiny
review. 11 If strict scrutiny review were applicable, "the federal government
would have to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest served by the
law. The finding of a compelling state interest would then necessitate a
determination of whether Congress sufficiently tailored the statute to the
government's interest." 1 9  If the court finds that the right at issue is not
115. Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 836 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)).
116. Id. at 842 ("Courts that have considered the effects of registration on an individual's
liberty have cited this privacy deprivation and interference with family relations, as well as a loss of
one's job opportunities, as a deprivation of a liberty interest."); Caroline Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional
Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89,
102 (1996) ("The Fourteenth Amendment protects individual freedom from arbitrary exercise of
government power, as well as individual interests in personal security, employment, and travel.");
Stephen R. McAllister, "Neighbors Beware": The Constitutionality of State Sex Offender
Registration and Community Notification Laws, 29 TEX. TECH L. REv. 97, 133 (1998) ("The
argument frequently made is that registration and notification laws unfairly 'stigmatize' sex
offenders with tangible and substantial consequences (e.g., loss of employment and housing, or
actual physical abuse and harassment by neighbors)."). Three potential liberty interests-the right to
privacy, the right to employment, and the right to personal security-will be discussed below in
detail.
117. Wilkins, supra note 103, at 1253 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (7th ed.
1999)).
118. Catherine A. Trinkle, Federal Standards for Sex Offender Registration: Public Disclosure
Confronts the Right to Privacy, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 299, 319 (1995).
119. Id. at 314; see also Lewis, supra note 116, at 102 ("Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process protects individuals from arbitrary state deprivation of liberty interests. In analyzing a
substantive due process claim, individual liberty infringements must be balanced against the state's
interest in maintaining an organized society."); Spencer, supra note 111, at 303 (stating that to
perform a substantive due process analysis, the court must first determine whether a fundamental
right is impacted, then apply the appropriate judicial test to determine whether a Due Process Clause
violation occurred, and lastly apply strict scrutiny if a fundamental constitutional right is implicated);
Trinkle, supra note 118, at 317; see also id. at 319 (reasoning that "[u]nder substantive due process
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fundamental, the court will apply the more reverential rational basis test. 20
Thus, in the context of the constitutionality of sex offender notification laws,
if a court finds a fundamental right implicated in the suit, these laws will be
found violative of the guarantee of substantive due process "[i]f the individual
liberty interests of former sex offenders outweigh the state interests in crime
prevention and law enforcement."
'' 2
'
B. The Right to Privacy
1. The Evolution of the Right to Privacy
Because of the intrusive nature of state sex offender notification schemes,
analyzing the infringement of these laws on an offender's fundamental
privacy rights provides the most obvious starting point in analyzing these laws
under substantive due process. 22 In determining whether the laws infringe
upon an offender's privacy rights, one preliminary issue is whether offenders
have a reasonable privacy interest in information such as their home address
and employment information, information relating to their offense, and their
photograph. 1
23
Judges have read a constitutional right to individual privacy into the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. As applicable to the present analysis of the constitutionality of
analysis, the threshold finding of a fundamental right justifies analysis of the registration statute's
constitutionality under the heightened strict scrutiny standard of review").
120. Spencer, supra note 11, at 299-300.
121. Lewis, supra note 116, at 102.
122. Judicial holdings in the context of the constitutionality of sex offender registration and
notification laws pursuant to the right to privacy inherent in the doctrine of substantive due process
suggest "that an individual's fundamental right to privacy provides the first, and perhaps most
obvious, basis for an examination of the Federal Registration Act under substantive due process
theory." Trinkle, supra note 118, at 315. Even though this right may provide the most obvious basis
for the examination of these laws:
To date, substantive due process claims drawn from the Supreme Court's uncertain
informational privacy jurisprudence.., have been rejected by the courts. Even when
notification is found to jeopardize a substantive right to privacy (usually because
registrants' home addresses and places of employment are disclosed), the right is deemed
subsidiary to the overriding public interest thought served by making such information
available. In other instances, no privacy right is recognized as a threshold constitutional
matter, on the reasoning that registrants have a lessened expectation of privacy as to such
"public" information, despite the fact that without notification the information is otherwise
not nearly so readily available for community inspection and use.
Logan, supra note 1, at 1186-87.
123. Lewis, supra note 116, at 96.
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sex offender notification laws, this constitutional right to privacy may be
violated when the state disseminates information to the community regarding,
among other things, the sex offender's name, photograph or physical
description, and home address and workplace information.
24
The judiciary has based the right to privacy in the substantive due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in order to protect
individuals from unjustifiable governmental intrusion. 25 As Justice Brandeis
opined: "'[T]he right to be let alone' is 'the right most valued by civilized
men. ' ' ', 26 The constitutional right to privacy is not a textual right, but the
judiciary has found this right to be an inherent one emanating from the Due
Process Clauses. 27 This right was bom in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut,12 8
in which the Supreme Court held that a privacy right existed in contraceptive
use. 129 This right quickly ballooned:
[t]his domain of unenumerated personal liberty now includes the right
to marry, to choose a marital partner, to establish a family, to define
family relationships, to procreate, to rear and educate one's children,
to determine one's sexual relationships, to prevent conception, to
terminate a pregnancy, and to seek medical treatment and care for
oneself.
130
The Griswold line of cases, recognizing personal autonomy, illustrates
one prong of the constitutional right to privacy: the freedom of individuals to
render decisions regarding the fundamental areas of their lives.' 3' As
discussed in detail below, the Supreme Court in the 1977 decision Whalen v.
124. "Applying the right of privacy to sex offenders, privacy is the right to live and maintain
anonymity in a community without being subject to community notification laws." Wilkins, supra
note 103, at 1254.
125. Lewis, supra note 116, at 96; see also KEYNES, supra note 11, at 158 ("[Sjome scholars
and jurists argue ... [that] these rights are judicial inventions that cannot even be inferred from the
Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.").
126. Lewis, supra note 116, at 96 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
127. Wilkins, supra note 103, at 1253; see also Billings & Bulges, supra note 43, at 224
(noting that in addition to being grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to privacy has also
been found to be implicit in a number of the first ten amendments to the Constitution).
128. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
129. Id. at 485; see also Wilkins, supra note 103, at 1253.
130. KEYNES, supra note 11l, at 158.
131. Billings & Bulges, supra note 43, at 224 (noting that one of the two main facets of the
"'right to privacy' . .. is "that individuals are free to make important decisions about life, such as
whether to marry, bear children and in what manner to raise those children").
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Roe also identified another prong of substantive due process that is
encompassed in the constitutional right to privacy: "the right to be free from
unwanted disclosure of personal information."'3 2  Because the sex offender
notification schemes cause personal information about sex offenders to be
widely disseminated to the public, the analysis of the constitutionality of these
laws under principles of substantive due process involves the latter prong and
will be analyzed in this Comment as such. However, it must be kept in mind
that although the Court continuously has expanded upon the right of privacy,
"the Court has never addressed the implications of that right for statutes that,
like the Federal Registration Act, allow full public disclosure of detailed
personal information."'
133
Additionally, many argue that the sex offender registration and
notification laws do not implicate an offender's constitutional right to privacy
because the offender jettisoned his privacy right upon committing such a
heinous crime. 134 However, it is not certain as a matter of law to what degree
these rights are reduced. 135 Moreover, although "[t]hose who commit or are
accused of a crime are generally considered to have a lowered expectation of
privacy regarding publication of information related to their crime," sex
offenders who have been released from incarceration differ "in that they have
already served their sentences."' 136 Opponents of the notification laws assert
that these laws hinder sex offenders' abilities to reintegrate into the
community; they question the validity of the statistics illustrating a high rate
of recidivism among sex offenders, and they contest the claim that sex
offenders cannot be rehabilitated. 1
37
132. Rafshoon, supra note 110, at 1647-48 (recognizing that "[t]he Court has identified two
types of privacy rights-the right to be free from unwanted disclosure of personal information and
independence in making certain decisions"); see also Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 836-37 ("This
privacy interest includes the right to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into private
matters and the right to prevent the disclosure of private matters."); Lewis, supra note 116, at 96;
Spencer, supra note 11l, at 302-03.
133. Trinkle, supra note 118, at 316.
134. Lewis, supra note 116, at 97: see also Wilkins, supra note 103, at 1253 (stating that
"courts often reject substantive due process claims because sex offenders 'have a lessened
expectation of privacy' as to the type of information shared with the public under community
notification laws even though the information would be more difficult to ascertain without
notification statutes"); Id. at 1254 (recognizing that some courts have held that convicted sex
offenders forfeit their right to privacy); Id. at 1254-55 ("Other courts have found that those sex
offenders who are dangerous and pose a threat to the public possess reduced privacy rights because
any infringement on their privacy must succumb to the need to protect the public's safety.").
135. Lewis, supra note 116, at 97.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 92-94. As one commentator asserted:
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Lastly, in addition to the issue of whether a convicted sex offender retains
his privacy right upon release from prison, the right "to be let alone' 38 is not
absolute-indeed, a line must be drawn in the sand demarcating when the
privacy interest and dignity of an individual person must succumb to the
"demands of the public welfare or of private justice."'' 39  Thus, if a court
would determine that the dissemination of a convicted sex offender's personal
information implicated a privacy interest, then, presumably, the court would
apply a heightened form of scrutiny, possibly even strict scrutiny.
1 40
2. Privacy Rights in Private Information: Whalen, Paul, and The Freedom of
Information Act
This section will explain the constitutional privacy precedent that is
particularly relevant to the analysis of whether notification laws infringe upon
a sex offender's privacy rights. The Paul Court addressed the constitutional
right to privacy when it determined whether the dissemination of the
plaintiffs photograph infringed upon the accused shoplifter's privacy
rights.141  The Court believed that the accused shoplifter's alleged right to
privacy was distinguishable from "matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. In
holding that the dissemination of this information did not violate the
offender's right to privacy,1 43 the Paul Court stated:
A familiar principle of the American criminal justice system is that after individuals have
served their sentence, they can put their criminal past behind them and endeavor to lead a
normal life. It follows that, once released from prison, offenders should reasonably expect
that they can keep their criminal pasts private and begin to rebuild their lives. By
authorizing public dissemination of information about released sex offenders' prior
offenses, however, sex offender laws shatter this expectation.
Id. at 96-97.
138. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
139. Lewis, supra note 116, at 96 (quoting Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)).
140. McAllister, supra note 116, at 134 (If strict scrutiny were applied, the government would
be required "to prove both a substantial or compelling governmental interest supporting the
imposition of such requirements on sex offenders and that the provision at issue is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest."). With respect to the level of scrutiny to be applied, one court noted as
follows: "[T]he confidentiality interest 'has not fared as well as .. . autonomy.' Most courts
addressing the right to confidentiality have applied a balancing, or intermediate, standard of
review.... Some courts, however, apply heightened scrutiny if the information involved is
considered 'fundamental."' Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 406 n.20 (N.J. 1995).
141. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976).
142. Id. at 713.
143. Id. at 713-14.
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Respondent's claim is far afield from this line of decisions. He claims
constitutional protections against the disclosure of his arrest on a
shoplifting charge. His claim is based, not upon any challenge to the
State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to
be "private," but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a
record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive
privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to
enlarge them in this manner. 144
In determining whether sex offender notification laws infringed upon a
convicted offender's asserted right to privacy, the courts of appeals have
repeatedly looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe 145 for
guidance. The Whalen decision was handed down post-Paul; consequently,
the Whalen decision likely expanded upon Paul's right to privacy holding.
146
In Whalen, a New York law required doctors to report to the government the
names of patients that were using certain types of prescription medication. 147
The Court upheld the law. 148  It held that the compilation of the patient's
information did not implicate a liberty interest because the information was
not disclosed to the public and security measures were enacted to ensure that
the information was not disseminated. 149  Because the collection of this
information without dissemination did not pose a threat to the patient's
privacy interest, the Court opted not to "decide any question which might be
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data-
whether intentional or unintentional--or by a system that did not contain
comparable security provisions."15
0
144. Id. at 713; see also Billings & Bulges, supra note 43, at 230-31 (citing Opinion of the
Justices of the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 757 (Mass. 1996) ("Even though the Court has recognized a
right to privacy in certain areas like marriage, procreation, and child rearing, it does not follow that
there is a right to privacy under the Federal Constitution that protects against unauthorized publicity
of private information.").
145. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
146. See, e.g., Paul P. v. Vemiero, 170 F.3d 396, 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Slayton v.
Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984)). Additionally, as one commentator reasoned:
"Whalen v. Roe modified the Court's position as announced in Paul and recognized a more
expansive privacy right." Trinkle, supra note 118, at 317.
147. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593.
148. Id. at 603-04.
149. Id. at 598, 600.
150. Id. at 605-06 (emphasis added); see also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir.
1981) (failing to recognize a general constitutional right to the nondisclosure of private information
and eliminating the need to require balancing government action against individual privacy, but
stating, "[o]ur opinion does not mean that we attach little significance to the right of privacy, or that
there is no constitutional right to nondisclosure of private information").
[87:939
WISCONSIN'S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
The issue concerning the public disclosure of private data as a protectable
privacy interest was also before the Court in two cases subsequent to the
Whalen decision.' 51 In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,'52 the issue before the Court was
whether the FBI could disclose criminal records, or "rap sheets," of
individuals pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).'53 The
reporters that requested the information argued that the individual did not
possess a privacy interest in his rap sheet because the events contained in the
document previously were disclosed to the public. 154 The Court "reject[ed the
reporters'] cramped notion of personal privacy." '55 The Court stated:
[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy
encompass the individual's control of information concerning his or
her person. In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at
one time or another divulged to another.... The very fact that federal
funds have been spent to prepare, index, and maintain these criminal-
history files demonstrates that the individual items of information in
the summaries would not otherwise be "freely available" either to the
officials who have access to the underlying files or to the general
public. 156
The Court held that the government could not release the information
contained in the rap sheet because of the individual's right to privacy. 151 In
formulating this holding, the Court recognized the "distinction... in terms of
personal privacy ... between scattered disclosure of the bits of information
contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole."'
' 58
However, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he question of the statutory
meaning of privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the same as the question
whether a tort action might lie for invasion of privacy or the question whether
an individual's interest in privacy is protected by the Constitution.' 159
Commentators have posited that despite the fact that the Reporters Committee
Court's decision was not premised on the Constitution per se, "the decision
151. Logan, supranote 1, at 1180.
152. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
153. Id. at 751.
154. Id. at 762-63.
155. Id. at 763.
156. Id. at 763-64.
157. Id. at 780.
158. Id. at 764.
159. ld. at 762 n. 13.
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demonstrates that an individual can claim a privacy interest in government
compilations which may not exist in scattered pieces of public
information."'
' 60
The Court rendered a decision similar to the Reporters Committee
decision in United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority.161 In this case, the issue before the Court was whether a number of
federal agencies could disclose to local unions the home addresses of the
agencies' employees who were involved in bargaining with the union. 62 The
Court held that this disclosure violated the employees' FOIA privacy rights.
1 63
Although the addresses were available in the public domain,164 the Court
opined: "An individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of
information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that
information may be available to the public in some form. 1 65  The Court
expressed its reluctance "to disparage the privacy of the home, which is
accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions";
166
accordingly, the Court did not permit the disclosure of the employees' address
information. 67  Significantly, this decision was also rendered pursuant to a
FOIA analysis and was not premised on a constitutional right to privacy.
The courts of appeals have applied these ambiguous precedents and
formulated a number of distinct holdings regarding whether the dissemination
of a sex offender's home address and employment information infringes on
his right to privacy. These decisions will be summarized below.
3. Privacy Precedent in the Context of Sex Offender Notification Laws
In the years preceding the United States Supreme Court's decision in Doe
v. Connecticut Department of Public Safety, lawsuits addressing an offender's
substantive due process rights and infringement on the offenders'
constitutional right to privacy were blasts in the explosion of litigation
addressing the constitutionality of sex offender registration and notification
160. Rafshoon, supra note 110, at 1649-50; see also id. at 1651 ("Read together, Constantineau
and Reporters Committee provide support for a substantive due process claim based on the right to
privacy. The released sex offender, no matter how horrific his crime, is entitled to a minimum
degree of privacy.").
161. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
162. Id. at489.
163. Id. at 502.
164. Id. at 500.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 501.
167. Id. at 502.
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schemes. Like the split among circuits and state courts with respect to the
constitutionality of these laws under principles of procedural due process,
courts addressing a sex offender's substantive due process and privacy rights
have reached divergent results. This section will explore these lower court
decisions in detail.
This section delineates the numerous lower court decisions into three
categories: (1) courts that addressed a sex offender's right to privacy as
grounded in principles of substantive due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and whose holdings turned on whether the disseminated
information already was available in the public domain; (2) courts holding
that no constitutional right to privacy was implicated because the state action
did not impinge on an offender's rights that are "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"; and (3) courts that recognized a constitutional right in the
offender's home address information, but found that the state's legitimate
interest in dissemination outweighed the offender's interest in privacy. Each
of these categories will be addressed below in turn.
First, courts have rendered decisions addressing a sex offender's right to
privacy as grounded in principles of substantive due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and holdings in these cases have turned on whether the
disseminated information already was in the public domain. Two of these
decisions will be discussed in detail, and it must be noted that other courts
have rendered holdings similar to those in these two decisions.
168
168. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that because the
dissemination of the offender's information was carefully designed and because the information
disseminated, including the general vicinity of the offender's residence, was available to the public,
the information disseminated was not "private" and thus not constitutionally protected); Helman v.
Delaware, 784 A.2d 1058, 1072 (Del. 2001) (finding that the sex offender had no privacy interest in
the dissemination of his personal information because "[a]n individual does not have a constitutional
right to keep private information that is already available to the public"); In re Meyer, 16 P.3d 563,
569 (Wash. 2001) (finding in the context of the Paul Court's "stigma plus" test that because the
information disseminated was widely available from public sources, no privacy interest was
implicated); Patterson v. Alaska, 985 P.2d 1007, 1016 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (citing Roe v. Wade
and Whalen v. Roe and recognizing a right to privacy in the non-disclosure of personal matters, but
finding that because a sex offender's biographical information was already public information, the
right to privacy "does not attach to matters already within the public domain"); see also Ohio v.
Wheeler, 99-L-095, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3395 (Ohio Ct. App. July 28, 2000) (holding that the
notification provisions did not deprive the offender of substantive due process because the statute
was rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose-protecting the public's health and safety).
But see Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997) (recognizing in the context of a
procedural due process analysis a liberty and privacy interest in the dissemination of the sex
offender's accumulated personal information; therefore, the offender was entitled to procedural due
process protections).
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In Corbin v. Chitwood,169 the sex offender asserted that the city and its
employees violated his constitutional right to privacy when they distributed
throughout the community a flier that contained his criminal record and his
home address information. The court quickly found that the offender did not
have a privacy right in this information. 70 Although discussing the FOIA line
of decisions, the court recognized that these decisions were not
constitutionally based. 71 Moreover, the court cited First Circuit precedent
mandating that "the right of confidentiality under the Constitution does not
extend 'beyond prohibiting profligate disclosure of medical, financial, and
other intimately personal data.'' ' 72  The court held that neither the sex
offender's arrest records nor his home address information fit these categories
because of their public availability. 73  Additionally, the court curtly
recognized that the sex offender's grievance was not solely the dissemination
of his home address: "It is his address coupled with his identity as a sex
offender that disturbs him."'
174
Similarly, in Akella v. Michigan Department of State Police, 75 the court
applied a two-pronged test to determine whether the public notification of the
offender's name, address, and arrest record violated his constitutional right to
privacy. Recognizing that Sixth Circuit precedent mandated that the court
must "'narrowly construe[] the holdings of Whalen and Nixon to extend the
right to information privacy only to interests that implicate a fundamental
liberty interest,"' the court set forth the following test to determine whether
the offender's privacy right was violated: "(1) the interest at stake must
implicate either a fundamental right or one implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty; and (2) the government's interest in disseminating the information
must be balanced against the individual's interest in keeping the information
private."' 76 With respect to the first prong, the court held that the plaintiff did
not have a privacy interest in protecting the dissemination of his arrest record
because it was public record. 77  Under the second prong, although not
explicitly recognizing that the plaintiff had a liberty interest in protecting the
169. 145 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Me. 2001).
170. Id. at 96-99.
171. Id. at 97.
172. Id. at 97 (quoting Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 183 (1st Cir.
1997)).
173. Id. at 98 n.3.
174. Id.
175. 67 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
176. Id. at 729 (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 683 (6th Cir. 1998)).
177. Id.
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dissemination of his home address information, the court held that the state
had a significant interest in disseminating the information.1
78
Second, courts have rendered decisions holding that the offender's
constitutional right to privacy was not violated because the state action did not
impinge on an offender's rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'179 For example, in Illinois v. Logan,'8 0 the sex offender claimed that
the state's dissemination of his address pursuant to the registration and
notification scheme violated his constitutional right to privacy. The court
quickly held that this interest was not protected under the "zone of privacy"
that is constitutionally protected.' 8' The court also recognized that although it
is not freely available, the information disseminated was a matter of public
record and thus could not be constitutionally protected. 182  The court also
noted that "any attendant consequences, such as embarrassment or ridicule,
are caused by the offender's status as a felon and not as a direct result of the
notification."'
' 83
Third, two courts have recognized a constitutional privacy right in the
offender's home address information, but found that the state's compelling
interest in dissemination outweighed the offender's interest in privacy. In
Doe v. Poritz,184 the sex offender asserted that the state's registration and
notification scheme infringed on his privacy right to be free from the
dissemination of personal information. Recognizing that an individual does
not have a privacy interest in matters of public record, the court first
addressed the offender's privacy interest in the disseminated information.
The court found that individuals do not have a privacy interest in an arrest
record, name, age, and place of employment because these all are matters of
178. Id. at 730.
179. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that because the
registration and notification scheme "does not impose any restrictions on [the offender's] personal
rights that are fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such as his procreative or
marital rights," the scheme did not infringe on the offender's asserted federal constitutional right of
privacy); Corbin v. Chitwood, 145 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D. Me. 2001) (acknowledging that
"substantive due process applies only to rights that are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' and holding that the offender's arrest record did not fall into this category); Dick v.
Gainer, No. 98-2287, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31988, at *7 (7th Cir. Dec. 16, 1998) (unpublished
opinion) (quickly rejecting the offender's violation of his constitutional right to privacy claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment because "[n]one of the traditional Fourteenth Amendment privacy rights
are at issue here").
180. 705 N.E.2d 152, 161 (I11. App. Ct. 1998).
181. Id. at 161.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
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public record.1 85 However, the court noted:
Our analysis is altered, however, by the disclosure of plaintiff's home
address, and more importantly, by the totality of the information
disclosed to the public. We believe that public disclosure of plaintiffs
home address does implicate privacy interests. "We are reluctant to
disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special
consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions.". .. The fact
that plaintiffs home address may be publicly available, therefore,
does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that public disclosure of his
address implicates no privacy interest. We note in particular that the
issue here is not whether plaintiff has a privacy interest in his address,
but whether the inclusion of plaintiffs address, along with other
information, implicates any privacy interest. 
186
Next, the Poritz court addressed whether the state interest in the
dissemination of this information justified its disclosure. For the following
reasons, the court ultimately held that the state interest in disseminating this
information substantially outweighed the offender's privacy interest in this
information: (1) the disseminated information was general and not
confidential; (2) the sex offender's danger of recidivism vested the state with
a compelling interest in disclosure; and (3) the scope of disclosure was
narrowly tailored to combat the sex offender's risk of reoffense.
187
Likewise, in Paul P. v. Verniero,188 the court held that a person has "some
nontrivial privacy interest" in home address disclosure. The court recognized
but dismissed counterarguments averring that home addresses are not private
because they are widely available in telephone directories. 189 However, the
court balanced the state's interest in disclosing this information with the sex
offender's privacy interest in this personal information.19° The court
ultimately held that the state had a compelling interest in preventing sex
offenses, and this interest outweighed the offender's privacy interest in the
185. Id. at 407.
186. Id. at 408-09 (internal citations omitted).
187. Id. at 411-12.
188. 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999).
189. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 501 (1994)); see also Doe v.
Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2001) ("[Wlhile much of the registry information
disclosed publicly is a compilation of information otherwise available to the public, the block address
of the home, employment, and school of the offender is not generally information that would
otherwise be publicly available.").
190. Paul P., 170 F.3d at 404.
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dissemination of his home address information. 19' Thus, these decisions
illustrate that courts addressing a convicted sex offender's privacy rights have
reached divergent results.
C. The Constitutional Right to Personal Security
In addition to privacy rights, also relevant to the constitutionality of sex
offender registration and notification laws is the issue of the offender's right
to personal security as grounded in principles of substantive due process. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized the right to personal security
19 2
as a "'historic liberty interest' protected substantively by the Due Process
Clause."'' 93 The use of the term "historic" certainly is accurate, as Blackstone
in 1765 wrote that the right to personal security is "one of three 'primary'
categories of absolute rights that imprisonment or other infirmities did not
extinguish."'
' 94
Generally, states have no constitutional duty to protect the public at
large.' 95 Through judge-made law evolved the state's duty to protect an
individual's personal security when the state has assumed responsibility for
his or her safety. 196 As such, the state has a constitutional duty to provide for
the personal security of institutionalized persons as well as persons confined
in state-run mental institutions. 97 In the context of sex offender notification
schemes, it must be noted that "the United States Supreme Court has never
held that formal state custody is necessary to establish a constitutional right to
personal security. Rather, the. Court has stated that the right to personal
security is 'not extinguished by lawful confinement,' thereby implying that
the right exists outside of institutional walls."'
198
191. Id.
192. This right also has been referred to as "a constitutional fight to safety." Lorene Feuerbach
Schaefer, Comment, Abused Children and State-Created Protection Agencies: A Proposed Section
1983 Standard, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1989).
193. Lewis, supra note 116, at 106 ("Personal security is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
194. James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual
Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 23 (1999) (quoting 1 EHRLICH'S
BLACKSTONE 46 (J.W. Erlich ed., 1959)), Blackstone defined "the right to personal security as
'consist[ing] of a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health, and his reputation."' Id. at 23 (quoting 1 EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 46 (J.W. Erlich ed.,
1959)).
195. Schaefer, supra note 192, at 1421; see also Lewis, supra note 116, at 107 ("The
Constitution... does not require the state to ensure the complete safety of all individuals.").
196. Schaefer, supra note 192, at 1421.
197. Id. at 1422 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
198. Id. at 1423 (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315). For a discussion of cases in which courts
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The issue in the context of the constitutionality of sex offender registration
and notification laws pursuant to substantive due process is whether the laws
afford offenders adequate protection from acts of vigilantism subsequent to
the state's public notification. To establish that these laws violate the
offender's constitutional right to personal security, a nexus must be
established between the state's dissemination of the offender's information
and the potential for vigilantism against the offender.' 99 Moreover, "[t]he
Supreme Court has intimated that, in cases where private action is the
proximate cause of harm to an individual, the degree of state involvement in
bringing about the private action must be substantial for responsibility to be
ascribed to the state. 2°0
A number of lower courts addressed the issue of the offender's liberty
interest in personal security in the context of the "stigma plus" procedural due
process analysis. For example, in Akella v. Michigan Department of State
Police, the plaintiffs alleged that the state's dissemination of information
regarding their convictions subjected them to "threats, anonymous letters
telling them to move, loss of housing, reduced educational opportunities for
themselves and their children," and in the context of the "stigma plus" test,
they alleged that this dissemination infringed upon their liberty interest in
personal security. 201  For support, the plaintiffs cited the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Kallstrom v. City of Columbus.20 2  In Kallstrom, the court
addressed the issue of whether the state's disclosure of a police officer's
personal information to defense counsel during a trial in which the officer
testified deprived the officer of substantive due process. 203 The Kallstrom
court "identified a due process right in the disclosure of highly personal
information where the disclosure places an individual 'at substantial risk of
recognized an individual's constitutional right to personal safety "outside of institutional walls," see
id. Moreover, as one commentator stated: "While notifying communities about the presence of
released offenders is not the same as imprisoning them or involuntarily committing them to mental
institutions, disseminating their names, addresses, and photographs still renders them susceptible to
vigilante attacks." Lewis, supra note 116, at 108.
199. Lewis, supra note 116, at 108-09; see also Hawaii v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Haw.
2001) ("[P]ublic disclosure may encourage vigilantism and may expose the offender to possible
physical violence."); Lewis, supra note 116, at 109 ("Defenders of the constitutional validity of
community notification measures may argue that the relationship between the state's disclosure of
identifying information about released offenders and the consequent vigilante violence directed
against them is too attenuated for the state to be responsible for the danger those individuals face.").
200. Lewis, supra note 116, at 108 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189
(1989)).
201. Akella v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
202. Id. (citing Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1998)).
203. Id. at 730-31 (citing Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1064).
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serious bodily harm, possibly even death, from a perceived likely threat.'" 204
The Akella court opted not to follow the reasoning of the Kallstrom court
because the information disclosed in Kallstrom constituted private
information; whereas the Akella court believed that the information
disseminated pursuant to the sex offender laws was public information.20 5
Although the offenders claimed that the dissemination of the circumstances
surrounding their conviction violated their constitutional right to personal
security, the court believed that this information was "already a matter of
public record that is available for inspection at a local police station."
20 6
Moreover, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that they faced a
207 tecdanger of substantial bodily harm. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim with respect to their allegation of a personal security
rights violation.2 °8
Similarly, in Patterson v. Alaska, the plaintiff alleged that the
dissemination of his personal information infringed upon his substantive due
process right of personal safety. 20 9 With respect to this allegation, the court
succinctly stated as follows: "Patterson has shown no adverse impact on any
liberty interest.... [The state's notification scheme] does not endanger
personal safety."2 0 Therefore, as these decisions illustrate, issues pertaining
to a convicted sex offender's personal security rights are extremely relevant to
the substantive due process analysis at hand.
D. The Constitutional Right to Employment
The right to work is a protectable liberty interest inherent in substantive
due process.211 The Supreme Court has stated that "'the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of
the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. ' '212 The Paul Court also suggested that
harm to the offender's current employment could constitute a sufficient "plus"
204. Id. at 730 (quoting Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1064).
205. Id. at 73 1.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Patterson v. Alaska, 985 P.2d 1007, 1017 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
210. Id.
211. Lewis, supra note 116, at 112 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 n.23
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
212. Id. at n.154 (citing Hampton, 426 U.S. at 102 n.23).
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under the "stigma plus" test.213
Precedent addressing the infringement of notification laws on an
offender's future earning capacity in the context of procedural due process
dictates convoluted results. In these cases, convicted offenders brought suit,
asserting that the dissemination harmed their future earning capacity or
potential to obtain gainful employment, and that this constituted a sufficient
"plus" pursuant to the Paul Court's "stigma plus" test. In one line of cases,
courts held that the speculative harm to the offender's earning capacity or
ability to obtain employment, usually coupled with a number of other "pluses"
(for example, reputational injury, privacy infringement, and continuing
registration burdens), fulfilled the "plus" facet and rendered the notification
laws violative of procedural due process.214 The raison d'dtre for these
decisions was that employers, once learning of the sex offender's status,
would exhibit a reluctance to employ someone of that character.215
Other judicial holdings decree a contrary outcome. In this line of cases,
courts refused to recognize the potential harm to the offender's future earning
213. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
214. Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 2001) (recognizing that "[t]he stigma of
public notification, including the block address of the sex offender's employer, inevitably will make
it difficult for offenders to obtain and keep employment," and holding that the harm to the offender's
earning capacity combined with a number of other deprived liberty interests fulfilled the "plus"
facet); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 682 (D.N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the harm to
the offender's employability, in combination with a number of liberty interests, as a sufficiently
deprived liberty interest); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (recognizing that the
harm to the offender's future employment opportunities fulfilled the "plus" facet); Espindola v.
Florida, 855 So. 2d 1281, 1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (agreeing that future employment
prohibitions satisfied the "plus" facet and noting that "the Supreme Court specifically mentioned
employment as a 'plus' factor in Paul v. Davis"); Hawaii v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Haw. 2001)
(recognizing the fact that the public notification procedure may adversely affect an offender's
professional life and employability as fulfilling the "plus" facet); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d
1007, 1013 (Mass. 1997) (holding that the potential harm to the offender's future earning capacity-
when combined with a number of liberty interests---constituted a sufficiently deprived liberty
interest)- Noble v. Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Or. 1998)
(holding that the offender's interest in avoiding ostracism, potential loss of employment, and danger
of physical harassment fulfilled the "plus" facet).
215. Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (opining that the dissemination of the
offender's personal information is "likely to make [the offender] completely unemployable"). As the
Bani court stated:
Potential employers and landlords will foreseeably be reluctant to employ or rent to [the
sex offender] once they learn of his status as a 'sex offender.' .. . Indeed, the public
disclosure provisions of HRS chapter 846E can adversely affect an offender's personal and
professional life, employability, associations with neighbors, and choice of housing.
Bani, 36 P.3d at 1265.
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capacity or potential employability as a "plus" under the "stigma plus" test.
2t6
Underlying a number of these decisions was the rationale that even though the
dissemination may render it difficult for a sex offender to obtain employment,
the dissemination did not foreclose all future employment opportunities.2t 7
Moreover, in a discrete line of cases, the courts failed to recognize a general
right to private employment; instead, the courts stated that the right to
employment extended only to governmental employment. 21 8  As these
decisions illustrate, lower courts have split on issues pertaining to a convicted
sex offender's future employment rights.
V. WISCONSIN'S NOTIFICATION LAWS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
This Comment posits a bright-line conclusion: Wisconsin's sex offender
216. Fullmer v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 207 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660-61 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(rejecting the offender's loss of employment claim because the disseminated information already was
available in the public domain); Akella v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 728-29
(E.D. Mich. 1999) (rejecting the offender's possibility of future employment harm claim and failing
to recognize this possible loss as a protectable liberty interest); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849,
855 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (rejecting the offender's future loss of employment claim because "such
injuries are purely speculative on the present record"); Helman v. Delaware, 784 A.2d 1058, 1072
(Del. 2001) (finding that the dissemination did not foreclose the offender from obtaining
employment).
217. See, e.g., Helman, 784 A.2d at 1072. In Helman, the court recognized that:
the dissemination of this information to certain employers in the community may make it
more difficult for [the offender] to obtain employment and establish familial and social
relationships, but the dissemination of this information does not completely foreclose him
from obtaining employment or establishing relationships. There is no evidence that
community notification will result in the alteration of a tangible interest held by [the
offender].
Id
218. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479-80 (6th Cir. 1999). In Cutshall, the
court began its analysis by noting that the dissemination hindered, but did not completely impede, the
offender's ability to obtain employment. Id. at 479. The court also reasoned as follows:
Courts recognizing a constitutionally protected right to employment have done so in very
limited circumstances and have dealt with terminations of government employment where
either state law or an agreement between the parties purports to limit the ability of the
government to terminate the employment. Cutshall has not cited, and we have not found,
any case recognizing a general right to private employment.
Id.; accord Haddad v. Fromson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096-97 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (labeling as
"strained" the offender's attempt to distinguish the Paul and Siegert holdings and citing Cutshall
when opining that "the injury to reputation and employability alleged by Plaintiff is precisely the
kind of harm that the Supreme Court has held does not rise to constitutional levels").
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notification laws unconstitutionally infringe on sex offenders' privacy rights,
personal security rights, and future earning capacity rights under substantive
due process precedent. Further, if strict scrutiny would be applied upon a
judicial finding agreeing that the laws resulted in these liberty interest
deprivations, the state's interest in public safety would not outweigh the
offenders' liberty interests in privacy, employment, and personal security.
This conclusion comports with the United States Supreme Court's recent
statement intimating that notification laws likely deprive offenders of
substantive, as opposed to procedural, due process.
A. Wisconsin's Notification Laws Infringe Upon Sex Offenders' Privacy
Rights
This Comment advocates the position that Wisconsin's sex offender
notification laws infringe upon registered sex offenders' privacy rights.
Pursuant to Wisconsin's sex offender public notification procedure, the
offender's personal information, such as work and address information, may
be disclosed to the public under certain circumstances. 21 9 The victim of the
sex crime and numerous agencies and organizations can receive this personal
information upon request. 22° The offender's exact address and place of
employment also can be disseminated to the general public upon request if the
police chief or sheriff determines that the dissemination of this information is
necessary.22  Although the offender's offense history and photograph are
available on Wisconsin's sex offender registration website, the offender's
exact home address is not included on this site out of fear of acts of
vigilantism against the offender. 2
One issue that arises in this analysis is the applicability of the line of the
Freedom of Information Act decisions to sex offender notification laws.
22 3
The facts and analyses contained in these decisions are similar to the facts and
analyses of notification law decisions. However, the Freedom of Information
Act decisions were rendered in the context of the FOIA and not on a
constitutional basis. 224 As one court stated, "[w]hile arguably not expanding
the right to privacy, Reporters Committee essentially summarized, albeit in
219. WIs. STAT. § 301.46(1)(b) (2002).
220. §§ 301.46(2)(b), (3)(b), (3)(e).
221. See generally § 301.46(5).
222. See Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/fyi/faq.jsp.
223. See supra Part IV.B.2.
224. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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another context, the notification authorized by Megan's law. ' 25 Because of
the strong analogies that can be drawn between the FOIA cases and the sex
offender notification cases, it seems inane to prevent the governmental
dissemination of certain private information under the FOIA and not prevent
the governmental dissemination of similar private information under the
Constitution.226 Because of these similarities, the Court may opt to extend this
reasoning in a substantive due process analysis, thereby prohibiting the
dissemination of convicted sex offenders' private information.
If the Court would opt not to extend the reasoning of the FOIA decisions
on a constitutional level, it likely would look to the Paul v. Davis and Whalen
v. Roe holdings for guidance. The Paul and Whalen Courts addressed the
issue of informational privacy rights.227 Although the Paul Court held that the
dissemination of an individual's address information was not within the
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy,, 228 the Whalen Court modified
this holding. The Whalen Court implicitly extended the right to privacy to
encompass the right not to have governmental actors disseminate personal and
private information to the public.229 Another issue in this analysis thus
becomes whether the information disseminated pursuant to Wisconsin's laws
can be considered "private" information when all the information is in the
public domain in some form.
This Comment advocates the position that the manner in which the
information is disseminated renders it "private" under the Whalen Court's
reasoning. As one court stated, "a privacy interest is implicated when the
government assembles those diverse pieces of information into a single
225. Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 681 (D.N.J. 1995).
226. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part IV.B.2.
228. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. But see Trinkle, supra note 118, at 317
(opining that Paul's holding "does not eliminate the possibility of a challenge to the Federal
Registration Act on privacy grounds").
229. Although the Whalen Court held that the collection of the patient's personal information
without its public dissemination did not pose a threat to the patient's privacy interest, one
commentator addressed this holding's relevance to the analysis at hand by stating as follows:
By their nature, community notification provisions afford no protection to individual
privacy as did the state regulation at issue in Whalen; indeed, the purpose of community
notification is to disseminate personal information about released sex offenders to the
public. Thus, the protection against disclosure of personal medical information
distinguishes the factual context of Whalen from the case of sex offender community
notification.
Lewis, supra note 116, at 100.
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package and disseminates that package to the public., 230  This reasoning is
persuasive, as it is not mandatory to publish a home address or telephone
number in a public directory, and one's place or type of employment certainly
can be kept from the public eye if so desired. When all of this information is
compiled and given to a random member of the public solely because of the
registrant's status as a sex offender, on its face this personal information
becomes far less "public" and carries a poignantly stigmatic meaning. It is the
manner in which these pieces of "public" information are disseminated that
renders this information protectable under Whalen.
23 1
Proponents of Wisconsin's laws would assert that these laws do not
infringe upon offenders' privacy rights because the laws are tailored to allow
the public at large to receive personal information about offenders only upon
request and with a determination that the dissemination is necessary;
accordingly, Wisconsin's laws are narrowly tailored to maintain some
semblance of the offender's privacy. This argument has some merit because,
for example, the Wisconsin offender's home address and employment
information is not included on the website, whereas other states have chosen
to include this information on their websites. However, pursuant to
Wisconsin law, any member of the general public can obtain this personal
information upon request and upon a determination that this dissemination is
"necessary, ' '232 and what constitutes "necessary" surely is a low bar.
Additionally, Special Bulletin Notification offenders are subjected to active
notification procedures, including door-to-door notification procedures.233
Thus, because of the high probability that any member of the community can
obtain any offender's home address and employment information at any time,
the laws still sufficiently infringe on the offenders' privacy interests.
Opponents of this conclusion also will assert that convicted sex offenders
230. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995).
23 1. The information disclosed under these laws "is of a far more sensitive, less public nature
than otherwise publicly available." Logan, supra note 1, at 1199. One commentator notes:
Although under Whalen the offender does not have the right to prevent the government
from gathering the private information, he does have an interest in preventing its
disclosure. Perhaps the offender's criminal record is not a private matter, but his home and
work addresses and phone numbers are still within the realm of privacy encompassed under
the term "liberty."
Earl-Hubbard, supra note 10, at 841; Rafshoon, supra note 110, at 1638 ("Community notification
laws do more than make information on convicted sex offenders available to the public. They give
police a green light to publicize the whereabouts and criminal histories of released offenders.").
232. See supra Part I.B.2.
233. See supra Part II.B.2..
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have a lessened privacy interest in their personal information because these
offenders jettisoned their privacy rights upon committing such a heinous
crime. It is true that "[t]hose who commit or are accused of a crime are
generally considered to have a lowered expectation of privacy regarding
publication of information related to their crime. 234 However, it also must be
kept in mind that these offenders already have served their sentences and have
been released into the public domain.235 The justice system has deemed it
appropriate to release these offenders into the community, yet these offenders
continue to be subjected to a unique form of ongoing and intrusive
punishment for crimes for which they have already served their sentences.
Perhaps the justice system's release of these offenders is the issue that should
be explored instead of punishing individuals after they have allegedly served
their time to society. Because offenders have already served their sentences
and because of the highly intrusive and stigmatic nature of the personal
information dissemination, Wisconsin's laws still violate offenders' privacy
rights, even assuming the offenders have a lowered expectation of privacy in
their personal information.
Wisconsin's notification procedures likely infringe on offenders' privacy
rights. This conclusion, however, does not end the analysis, as any offender
must then withstand a judicial application of heightened scrutiny. Thus far,
"[s]ubstantive due process claims relying upon privacy rights have not been
successful, as public notification outweighs any infringement on the
substantive due process rights of sex offenders. 236
If the offender is found to have a protectable privacy interest with respect
to his address information, the offender likely can prove that his interest in
privacy is stronger than the state's compelling interest in dissemination.
Lower courts have not held in accordance with this conclusion. As the Paul
P. v. Verniero court stated, "the state interest, which we characterized as
compelling, 'would suffice to justify the deprivation even if a fundamental
right of the registrant's were implicated."'237  Likewise, the Doe v. Poritz
court held that "[a]lthough the potential consequences of active dissemination
under the Notification Law alter the privacy interests, the incursion on those
interests is necessary for the protection of the public, as the means chosen are
narrowly tailored to that interest.,
238
234. Lewis, supra note 116, at 97.
235. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
236. Wilkins, supra note 103, at 1253.
237. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d
1077, 1104 (3d Cir. 1997)).
238. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 413 (N.J. 1995).
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Public perception with respect to the state's fervent and justifiable interest
in crime prevention versus public perception with respect to a convicted sex
offender's privacy rights falls on opposite ends of the spectrum. However,
public perception must not set in motion a judicial decision that transgresses
constitutional precedent. Indeed, "[i]t is a fair summary of history to say that
the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies
involving not very nice people.,
239
Wisconsin's sex offender notification laws severely infringe upon a
convicted offender's privacy rights, and as discussed below, also serve to
endanger his personal security and harm his future earning capacity. The state
certainly has a fervent and justifiable interest in crime deterrence and
prevention as well as public protection; certainly many would label this
interest as more compelling than a convicted sex offender's liberty interest.
But the state's interest does not outweigh the state's act of subjecting the
released offender to personal harm and loss of privacy when he is attempting
to assimilate into the community. The infringement on the sex offender's
privacy rights and other liberty interests is far too weighty to render the laws
constitutional on the basis of the state's compelling interest. Moreover,
because "the success of community notification measures in preventing
reoffense is disputed, the degree of need for communities to have access to the
information identifying released sex offenders is unclear., 240 Thus, the state's
interest in public safety likely does not outweigh the severe governmental
infringement on the sex offender's substantive due process liberties.
Lastly, supporting the conclusion that the Court may find that notification
schemes similar to Wisconsin's scheme are unconstitutional is its decision to
explicitly leave open the possibility that these laws violate substantive due
process. By this statement, the Court implied that the state's interest in sex
offense prevention does not outweigh the state's infringement on an
offender's substantive due process liberty interests. Thus, notification laws
similar to Wisconsin's laws likely are unconstitutional.
B. Wisconsin's Notification Laws Hinder Sex Ofjenders' Employment
Opportunities
Convicted sex offenders, like all American citizens, have a protectable
right to work that is grounded in principles of substantive due process. 241 If
presented with this claim in the context of Wisconsin's sex offender laws, the
239. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950).
240. Lewis, supra note 116, at 101.
241. See supra Part 1V.D.
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Court likely would find that Wisconsin's laws violate substantive due process
because they have the net effect of hampering convicted sex offenders'
employment opportunities and future earning capacities.242
Wisconsin's laws mandate that sex offenders provide the registry with
information relating to their employer.243 This information can be provided to
the general public.244  Employers may not want to hire convicted sex
offenders when the offenders' personal information is publicly available
because the employer may be afraid that this hire would eventually lead to a
loss of business.245 Thus, Wisconsin's laws quite likely hinder a convicted
sex offender's ability to obtain and retain employment: The laws foster
employers' reluctance to hire convicted sex offenders and thereby can
completely foreclose convicted sex offenders from obtaining employment.
C. Wisconsin's Notification Laws Do Not Protect Offenders' Personal
Security
The right to personal security is encompassed in the substantive due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.246 This right
ensures sex offenders security after their release from state confinement, but
because private actors-in contrast to state actors-tend to perpetrate harm
upon sex offenders after their release, the state action must be "substantial for
responsibility to be ascribed to the state. ' '247  Wisconsin's sex offender
notification laws likely violate sex offenders' right to personal security
because these laws do very little to deter acts of vigilantism against offenders.
Few would deny that a nexus exists between the state's dissemination of
the offender's information and the potential for vigilantism against the
offender. As Judge Posner has stated: "'If the state puts a man in a position of
danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be hard to
242. See Lewis, supra note 116, at 112 ("Community notification measures are likely to hinder
released offenders' ability to find employment.").
243. See supra Part Il.B.2.
244. See id.
245. See Lewis, supra note 116, at 112 ("Labeling individuals as convicted sex offenders may
engender fear in employers, either of the offender himself or of loss of business."); see also id. at 113
("[A]bsent community notification, employers would feel less pressured to refuse to hire a released
offender by fear of loss of business from customers aware of the offender's past.").
246. See supra Part V.C.
247. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. But see Lewis, supra note 116, at 109 (stating
that proponents of community notification laws "may argue that the relationship between the state's
disclosure of identifying information about released offenders and the consequent vigilante violence
directed against them is too attenuated for the state to be responsible for the danger those individuals
face").
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say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it
had thrown him into a snake pit.' ' '248  If the state did not disseminate the
offender's status and personal information, few would know of the offender's
status, thereby decreasing the opportunity for public retaliation against the
offender.
Arguments have been posited, and quite rightfully so, that these laws do
not provide offenders adequate protection,249 and vigilantism against -sex
offenders following community notification has been well-documented.
Community meetings and door-to-door warnings practically beg for acts of
retaliation from a community that fails to understand the offender's mental
state and fails to acknowledge the fact that offenders have been living in their
communities and neighborhoods for years.250 One study found that public
notification resulted in the harassment of 26% of offenders, 25' and of those
harassed, 73% of the offenders' families were also harassed.252  As a direct
result of the public notification laws, sex offenders have been attacked,
abused, harassed, and terrorized. 53  Retaliatory acts such as these occur in
even our own backyard: One Wisconsin sex offender was continuously
threatened, words such as "pervert" were spray-painted onto his home, and
upon an attempt to move to a new neighborhood, the retaliators located him
248. Lewis, supra note 116, at 109 (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982)).
249. See, e.g., id. at 112 ("The nexus between community notification and the increased risk of
vigilantism is sufficiently close to violate substantive due process."); id. at 106 ("Violence directed
against sex offenders has not been isolated to a few incidents."). Additionally, as one commentator
maintained:
The most significant practical problem associated with community notification is the
enormous potential it creates for vigilantism. Supporters of community notification insist
that vigilantism is rare and that most communities react calmly to word that a sex offender
has moved into the neighborhood. But how are we to measure what level of violence or
mob rule is tolerable for a system with no proven effectiveness? Is even a single incident
of community justice, even if no one is killed, an acceptable level? If so, it seems unlikely
that vigilantism will stop with an isolated incident.
Rafshoon, supra note 110, at 1673.
250. Van Duyn, supra note 17, at 657.
251. Billings & Bulges, supra note 43, at 254 (citing Tracy L. Silva, Dial "1-900-PERVERT"
and Other Statutory Measures that Provide Public Notification of Sex Offenders, 48 SMU L. REV.
1961, 1983 (1995)).
252. Id. (citing Katherine Seligman, Molesters' "Scarlet Letter" Bill: Is Public Disclosure
Invasion of Privacy?, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 6, 1994, at Al.)
253. Koresh A. Avrahamian, A Critical Perspective: Do "Megan's Laws" Really Shield
Children From Sex-Predators?, 19 J. JUV. L. 301, 313 (1998) (citing James Popkin, Natural Born
Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 73).
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and continued their abuse.254 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized
that "sex offenders have suffered adverse consequences, including vandalism,
loss of employment, and community harassment.,
255
Unlike other states, however, Wisconsin does not disseminate the
offenders' home addresses and employment information on its sex offender
notification website.256 The state's protection of this information may militate
against the conclusion that Wisconsin fails to adequately protect offenders'
security upon their release from confinement. However, any member of the
general public can obtain this personal information on request, 257 thereby
increasing the likelihood that these offenders will be harassed. Additionally,
the offender's name, photograph, and zip code are included on the website,
and his home address could be obtained in many cases simply by looking up
his name in a telephone directory or on the Internet. Lastly, Special Bulletin
Notification offenders are subject to active notification procedures, including
door-to-door notification and community meetings,258 and obviously, this
form of notification does not serve to protect these offenders. Thus, although
Wisconsin does not include the offender's home address and employment
information on its website, the fact that this information is readily available
does not sufficiently serve to protect registered offenders from harassment and
vigilantism.
The most apparent explicit measure the Wisconsin legislature has
employed to combat acts of vigilantism against sex offenders is evident on its
sex offender notification website. On this website, the following disclaimer
appears:
It is not the intent of the Legislature that this information be used to
injure, harass, or commit a criminal act against persons named in the
registry, their families, or employers. Anyone who takes any criminal
action against these registrants, including vandalism of property,
verbal or written threats of harm or physical assault against these
registrants, their families or employers is subject to criminal
259prosecution.
254. Interview with Ronald P. Blair, supra note 49.
255. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 1 26, 605 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Wis. 2000).
256. See generally Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/proginfo/communitynotification.jsp.
257. See supra Part II.B.2.
258. See supra Part II.B.2.
259. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Sex Offender Registry, at
http://offender.doc.state.wi.us/public/disclaimer.jsp.
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For one, surely this disclaimer will not deter an individual from
committing an act of violence against an offender if that individual truly
desires to do so. Moreover, the argument may be made that this disclaimer
illustrates that the state is aware of the fact that "vigilantes are likely to use
that information to locate and to harm those particular individuals. 26 ° On the
other hand, some may argue that it is precisely because the state discourages
vigilantism against offenders that it cannot be held responsible for any
inflicted harm. This argument is devoid of merit, as "state intent carries no
weight in substantive due process analysis; it is the actual effect of the laws on
individual rights that is balanced against their furtherance of state interests. 261
Thus, because Wisconsin does little to protect offenders from vigilantism
despite making their information readily available to the public, Wisconsin's
laws likely violate convicted sex offenders' substantive due process rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
On one hand, sex crimes are heinous, inherently harmful, and highly
intrusive crimes. On the other hand, sex offender registration and notification
laws severely infringe on registered sex offenders' privacy rights, endanger
these individuals' personal security, and likely hinder employment
opportunities for these individuals. The societal response to sex offenses must
be severe; however, this response must remain within the bounds of
constitutionality mandated by the United States Constitution.
Wisconsin's sex offender notification scheme does not fall within these
bounds. The Wisconsin legislature has unconstitutionally infringed upon
convicted sex offenders' substantive due process liberty interests, and because
of the severity of the infringement, these laws would not survive strict
scrutiny review. The United States Supreme Court explicitly left open the
possibility that notification schemes deprive registered offenders of
substantive due process, and Wisconsin's scheme is not sufficiently tailored to
fall outside this realm of potential unconstitutionality. Thus, for Wisconsin's
scheme to be constitutional, the legislature must amend these laws to cause a
lesser dissemination of the offenders' private information to the public.
MELISSA BLAIR
260. Lewis, supra note 116, at 109. One commentator believes that the state "provide[s]
vigilantes with the means of locating their victims." Id. at 110-11.
261. Idat 111.
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